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THE CASE OF TWO BIOLOGICAL INTENDED MOTHERS: 
ILLUSTRATING THE NEED TO STATUTORILY DEFINE 
MATERNITY IN MARYLAND 
Sam was born a happy and healthy baby boy, much to the delight of 
his mothers, Sarah and Jen. Although Jen gave birth to Sam, Jen has 
no genetic connection to her son. Biologically, Sarah is Sam's "ova 
mother ,,[ because Sam was conceived through assisted reproductive 
technology using Sarah's ovum that was fertilized in vitro by an 
anonymous sperm donor and implanted in Jen. Both Sarah and Jen 
share a biological connection to Sam, Sarah through DNA and Jen 
through carrying him for nine months and giving birth. 
Consequently, Sam has two biological mothers. Yet, in Maryland, at 
the time of Sam's birth only Jen is legally recognized as his mother. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Maryland law fails to adequately protect the parental rights of an 
ova mother who provides ova to her lesbian partner so that they can 
conceive a child together through assisted reproductive technology 
(ART).2 Maryland needs a maternity statute declaring that at birth an 
ova mother, like Sarah, is the legal mother of a child conceived 
through ART.3 The objective of this comment is to demonstrate how 
statutorily defining the ova mother's role as a natural parent at birth is 
necessary to protect her parental rights. Without such a statute, an 
ova mother faces the risk of being treated by the law as an ova donor 
and never having her parental rights to her own child recognized.4 
Part II of this comment begins with a discussion of how ova 
mothers in Sarah's situation in Maryland currently establish their 
parental rights and the inherent flaws in that system. Currently, ova 
mothers must depend on the consent of the birth mother and judicial 
determinations made in equity to establish their parental rights 
I. For purposes of this comment, I will use the terms "birth mother" and "ova mother" to 
differentiate between the two mothers. I define ova mother as the woman who 
provides an ovum to her partner to conceive a child with the intent that they both 
serve as mothers. The birth mother is a gestational carrier who carries and gives birth 
to the child with intent to also be the child's mother. 
2. See infra Part II. Black's Law Dictionary defines "assisted reproductive technology" 
as "[a]ny medical means of aiding human reproduction, esp. through laboratory 
procedures." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 139 (9th ed. 2009). 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part II. 
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because there is no law that recognizes their maternity. S Should the 
couple breakup, a court resolving a dispute between the ova mother 
and the birth mother would have no statutory law to rely on in 
making its decision as to the legal parentage of the child.6 
In Part III, I will discuss legal precedents in other states, 
established through case law involving disputes between an ova 
mother and a birth mother. While judges in these cases ultimately 
concluded that the birth mother and the ova mother had coequal 
parental rights, these decisions relied on equity and construction of 
law, thereby leaving room for judicial discretion and the possibility 
of varying outcomes in future cases. 7 While legally sound, such 
decisions are subject to challenge and do not provide future litigants 
with the certainty appropriate for issues of parenthood and family.s 
In Part IV, I will examine how parentage statutes adopted in other 
states handle issues of disputed maternity for children born as a result 
of ART. Because many states that have statutes establishing parental 
rights have adopted either the 1973 or the 2000 version of the 
Uniform Parentage Act (UP A or the Act)/ my analysis will focus on 
the implications of both versions of the Act and how they define 
maternity.1O I will also examine and critique the American Bar 
Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive 
Technology'S (ABA Model Act) determination of maternity. 11 
In Part V, I will discuss my proposal for a statute in Maryland that 
would define the ova mother in this situation as a legal and natural 
mother of the child at birth. My proposed statute defining maternity 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. See infra Part III. 
8. See infra Parts II-IV. 
9. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note 1 (2000) (amended 2002). The Uniform 
Parentage Act (UP A or Act) provides a set of uniform rules for establishing parental 
rights, which may be adopted by state legislatures. Originally approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973, the Act was 
revised in 2000 and amended in 2002. This revision incorporated provisions from 
both the Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act (upUF A) and the Uniform 
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA). Both the 1973 and the 
2000 versions of the UP A are most noted for promulgating the presumption of a 
parent-child relationship between children and their unmarried parents. The amended 
2000 Act features significant changes based upon scientific advancements in the area 
of assisted reproductive technology beyond just artificial insemination. Compare 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3, 5 (1973), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
sharedldocs/parentage/upa73.pdf, with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201, 701 (2000) 
(amended 2002), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/sharedldocs/parentage/ 
upa_final_2002.pdf. 
10. See infra Part IY.A-B. 
II. See infra Part IV.C. 
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borrows from the concepts in both versions of the UP A and the ABA 
Model Act, and expands upon them to specifically address a scenario 
where the birth mother and the ova mother are a lesbian couple who 
collaborate to conceive a child with the shared intention of being 
coequal parents. 12 
II. CURRENT STATE OF MARYLAND LAW FOR OVA 
MOTHERS 
While Maryland law delineates how to establish paternity for a 
child,13 there is no statutory definition of maternity. 14 The law 
apparently presumes that the woman who gives birth is the child's 
mother. IS Consequently, when a lesbian couple in Maryland has a 
child through ART, whereby one partner carries the child and the 
other partner provides the ovum that was fertilized to conceive the 
child, only the birth mother is automatically recognized as a legal 
parent. 16 Without additional legal action, the child's ova mother will 
remain a legal stranger to her own biological child. The implications 
of this are wide-ranging. 17 
With the recent passage of same sex marriage in Maryland,18 two 
married women who conceive a child together could argue they are 
both legal mothers because a "child born or conceived during a 
marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of both spouses.,,19 
Relying on the marital presumption, however, might not provide 
adequate ~rotection of parental rights absent a statutory definition of 
maternity. 0 In In re Adoption of Sebastian, an ova mother who was 
married to her child's birth mother petitioned the Surrogate Court of 
New York County for adoption of the child.21 The court noted that 
the child had a recognized and protected parent-child relationship 
12. See infra Part v. 
13. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-306 (LexisNexis 2006). 
14. See FAM. LAW § 5-301(f) (defining parent as an individual who meets the criteria to 
qualify for paternity under section 5-306 or "is the mother"). The statute includes no 
further definition of mother. Id. 
15. See id. 
16. See id. The statute provides no vehicle for recognizing the maternity rights of a 
genetic mother who is not the birth mother. See id. 
17. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
18. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); Civil 
Marriage Protection Act, ch. 2, 2012 Md. Laws 9. 
19. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (LexisNexis 2012). 
20. See In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 681, 692-93 (Sur. Ct. 2009) 
(holding that absent a maternity statute in New York adoption was the sole means for 
an ova mother to establish legal parentage that would be recognized across the states 
to the child of her wife the birth mother). 
21. Id. at 679. 
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with both mothers in New York because New York recognized the 
marriage between the two women as valid, but found that a judicial 
determination of parentage was necessary because most states in the 
country would not recognize the marriage.22 Because the New York 
statutory code had no provision for judicially establishing maternity 
for an ova mother, the court held that adoption would be necessary to 
provide certainty that the parent-child relationship would be 
recognized and protected across the states.23 While there is currently 
a split among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding 
whether the public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause permits a state to not recognize a judicial decree of parentage 
such as adoption,24 a judicial determination of parentage remains the 
strongest measure to ensure that the parent-child relationship is 
recognized as states are not bound to recognize same-sex marriages 
formed in other states.25 
Parenthood is a constitutionally protected fundamental right that 
grants parents the right to "make decisions concerning the care, 
custody, and control of their children.,,26 Parenthood also implicates 
the constitutional right to privacy that grants fit parents the autonomy 
to make parenting decisions without state intervention. 27 Yet if the 
law does not recognize the ova mother's parental status, she would be 
treated as a third party with no right to custody or visitation of the 
child except as permitted by the child's legal parent, the birth 
22. ld. at 682-83, 692-93. Same sex marriage is only permitted in nine states including 
Maryland. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-20 (2012); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 19, § 650 
(2012); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 457:1-a (2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2012); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2012); Vamum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (holding that state statute limiting civil marriage to a 
union between a man and a women violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa 
Constitution); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) 
(holding that pursuant to the Massachusetts Constitution the state may not deny the 
protections of civil marriage to same sex couples). Even though a same-sex marriage 
may be legally formed in some states, courts across the country have held that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution does not require recognition 
of the marriage because it is against the state's public policy. See, e.g., Wilson v. 
Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 
326 S.W.3d 654,659 (Tex. App. 2010). 
23. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 691-92. 
24. Compare Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause required Oklahoma to recognize adoptions by same-
sex couple validly decreed in other states), with Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 149 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that Louisiana was not required to recognize an adoption by a 
same-sex couple validly decreed in another state). 
25. See supra note 22. 
26. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972)). 
27. ld. at 77-79 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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mother.28 If the couple was unmarried and broke up, the ova mother 
would have no standing to file for custody, or even visitation.29 
Moreover, even if the couple was married, but they moved to a state 
that does not recognize their marriage, the ova mother's parental 
rights might not be protected.30 This lack of legal protection is not 
only harmful to the ova mother, but is also harmful to the child.3! 
Without a recognized parent-child relationship with the ova mother, 
the child is denied rights of support from the non-legally recognized 
mother,32 rights of inheritance,33 social security benefits/4 and the 
emotional benefits of having two parents. 
A. Orders of Parentage 
In the absence of a statute that establishes maternity, a lesbian who 
provides ova to her partner who gives birth to their child may have 
three options for establishing her parental rights in Maryland.35 None 
of these options have any statutory basis in Maryland law, rather they 
rely on judicial determinations made in equity and construction of 
law.36 First an ova mother may petition for a pre-birth or post-birth 
order from the court declaring that she and the child's birth mother 
are the child's legal parents.37 In the petition for a pre-birth order, the 
ova mother and the birth mother clearly state their relationship to 
each other and that they are both the intended legal parents to the 
28. See Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 443, 921 A.2d 171, 194 (2007) (holding that the 
parental unfitness and exceptional circumstances threshold applied to third party 
custody disputes also determines third party visitation); McDermott v. Dougherty, 
385 Md. 320, 418-19, 869 A.2d 751, 808-09 (2005) (holding that absent 
extraordinary circumstances granting custody to a third party infringes on a fit 
parent's constitutional right to parenthood). 
29. See Koshko, 398 Md. at 443,921 A.2d at 194; McDermott, 385 Md. at 418-19,869 
A.2d at 808-09. 
30. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text; supra notes 27-29 and accompanying 
text. 
32. MD. CODE ANN., F AM. LAW § 5-203(b) (LexisNexis 2006). 
33. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-209 (LexisNexis 2011) (defining issue). 
Absent a determination of parentage, the child would not be considered the issue of 
his genetic mother. Id. Consequently, he would not be able to inherit under 
Maryland's laws of intestacy. Id. § 1-210. 
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(I) (2006). 
35. Telephone Interview with Margaret Swain, R.N., J.D., Law Office of Margaret Swain 
(Nov. 9,2011); see also supra notes 37, 44-45, 59 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra Part ILA-B. 
37. Telephone Interview with Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
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child.38 They also include affidavits from the reproductive 
endocrinologist who performed the procedure, to support that both 
the ova mother and the birth mother clearly expressed their intent to 
be parents to the child.39 Practitioners in this area of law recommend 
that the mothers create an ART contract, before any medical 
procedures are performed, that establishes that the ova mother is 
providing her ova to the birth mother without relinquishing her 
maternity rights to the resulting child.40 Under this contract, the birth 
mother and ova mother agree that they are both the intended legal 
parents of the child.41 This contract is also included with the petition 
for a pre-birth or post-birth order.42 
If the judge finds the evidence in the petition sufficient, he or she 
might issue an order of parentage before the child is born, 
establishing that both women are the child's legal parents.43 Judges 
may be unwilling, however, to grant an order declaring parentage 
before the child is born.44 The parties may have to wait until the child 
is born and get a post-birth order of parentage.45 Post-birth orders 
declaring parentage, if issued, may be granted based on the same 
evidence as pre-birth orders and have the same legal effect: both 
women are judicially recognized as parents. 46 
The problem in relying on a court order declaring parentage is that 
the legal authority of these orders has not been established because 
there are no reported cases in Maryland wherein a party has 
challenged such an order.47 Consequently, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals has not had the opportunity to opine on their legality. 48 In 
declaring that both mothers are legal parents to the child, the court 
uses its equitable powers to confer judicial recognition on the intent 
of the mothers in creating the child and construes existing statutory 
38. Id. See also CHARLES P. KiNDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN McBRIEN, ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 
359-60 (2d ed. 2011). 
39. Telephone Interview with Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
40. KiNDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 38, at 334-39. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 333-39; Telephone Interview with Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
43. KiNDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 38, at 356-64; Telephone Interview with 
Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
44. Telephone Interview with Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
45. KiNDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 38, at 357-64; Telephone Interview with 
Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
46. Telephone Interview with Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
47. Id. 
48. See id. 
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law to infer the power to adjudicate maternity.49 However, the 
Maryland Code does not statutorily provide for judicial 
deternlinations of maternity, as it does for paternity outside of the 
context of adoption proceedings. 50 This is presumably because the 
legislature did not foresee maternity requiring judicial determination 
in the same way that paternity can.51 Consequently, in deciding 
whether or not to grant the order, judges make their decisions based 
in equity and construction of law. 52 
Without a statutory basis for these decisions, there is a degree of 
uncertainty about whether the orders would survive a challenge. 
Imagine a scenario where a couple who was granted a pre-birth order 
declaring both the ova mother and the birth mother-to-be the legal 
parents of child breaks up before the child is born or shortly 
thereafter. The mother carrying the child might decide she no longer 
wants to be connected with the ova mother and seek to disestablish 
the ova mother's maternity by petitioning the court to invalidate the 
order. The birth mother could reasonably argue that, in law, she is 
the only legally recognized mother of the child,s3 and that the order of 
parentage cannot and should not be enforceable because it infringes 
on her fundamental right to parenthood. 54 While the birth mother 
consented to the order and expressed her intent that both she and the 
ova mother were the intended parents, the birth mother may not be 
estopped from challenging it if a court finds no permissible legal 
basis for the order. 55 The lack of statutory basis for the order56 
combined with a lack of prior case law in Maryland recognizing 
intent as a factor in determining parentage57 could lead a court to 
invalidate the order. As a result of such a decision, the ova mother 
would be divested of her parental rights. 58 This hypothetical scenario 
49. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1032 (LexisNexis 2006) (outlining the process 
whereby the court has the power to pass an order declaring paternity); Telephone 
Interview with Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
50. F AM. LAW § 5-1032; see also In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 279-80, 923 A.2d 115, 
122-23 (2007). 
51. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 279, 923 A.2d at 122 ("[T]he legislature did not 
contemplate anything outside of traditional childbirth."). 
52. See FAM. LAW § 5-1032; supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
53. See supra notes 16,47-51 and accompanying text. 
54. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
55. See supra notes 47--48 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51. 
57. See In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 284-85 n.15, 923 A.2d 115, 125 n.15 (2007) 
(asserting that the court was not creating an "intent" test for women). 
58. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
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illustrates the risk ova mothers are forced to take in relying on these 
judicial decisions made in equity. 
B. Stepparent or Second Parent Adoption 
In the event that the couple cannot obtain an order of parentage 
either pre-birth or post-birth, their final option for gaining recognition 
of dual parentage is for the ova mother to adopt the child. 59 In fact, 
some Maryland practitioners recommend clients pursue adoption 
rather than an order of parentage because adoption is less liable to 
attack since it is based in law.60 The couple may petition the court for 
a stepparent ado~tion if they are married or a second parent adoption 
if they are not. 1 In the stepparent and second parent adoption 
processes, the birth mother who is considered the child's only legal 
parent consents to the adoption without terminating her parental 
rights. 62 The ova mother becomes legally recognized as the child's 
second parent with "all rights and obligations of a natural parent.,,63 
There are several problems with the stepparent or second parent 
adoption solution. The primary purpose of adoption is "to create a 
legal connection between an adoptive parent and child who are not 
biologically related, thereby conferring on each legal rights and 
obligations that did not previously exist between them.,,64 In Green v. 
Sollenberger, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that natural 
parents are not permitted to adopt their own children because these 
legal rights and obligations between parent and child already exist. 65 
The legality of an ova mother adopting her own child depends on the 
definition of natural mother. Where a woman becomes pregnant 
59. Telephone Interview with Margaret Swain, supra note 35. 
60. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-3B-20 to -21 (LexisNexis 2006); Telephone 
Interview with Michele Zavos, Esq., Zavos luncker Law Grp. PLLC (July 17,2012). 
Zavos is also a member of the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys and the 
American Academy of Assisted Reproductive Technology Attorneys. About Michele 
Zavos, ZAVOS JUNCKER LAW GROUP, PLLC, http://www.zavoslawgroup.coml 
about.html (last visited Jan. 11,2013). There is also a financial incentive for pursuing 
adoption over an order of parentage because many families who adopt children can 
take advantage of a federal tax credit to recoup their legal expenses. See 1.R.c. § 23 
(2006) amended by American Taxpayer Relief Act of2012, Pub. L. 112-240, 126 Stat 
2313 (2013). 
61. See FAM. LAW §§ 5-3B-20 to -21. 
62. FAM. LAW §§ 5-3B-20 to -21; see also MD. R. FAM. LAW ACTIONS FORM 9-102.5 
(LexisNexis 2012). This form allows a parent to consent to an independent adoption 
without termination of parental rights. Id. 
63. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-3B-25(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006); Beckman v. Boggs, 
337 Md. 688, 692, 655 A.2d 901, 903 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Koshko 
v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007). 
64. Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 127-30,656 A.2d 773, 777-79 (1995). 
65. ld. 
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through in vitro fertilization using a donated egg and is the intended 
mother of the child rather than a gestational surrogate, the law would 
recognize her as a "natural parent.,,66 However, if the birth mother 
were a gestational surrogate who was not the intended mother of the 
child she might not be considered a natural parent. 67 In In re Roberto 
d.B., the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a woman in this 
position could disestablish her maternity in the same manner as a 
man can disestablish paternity. 68 Here, the court used an equal 
protection analysis to interpret Maryland's parentage statutes as 
affording women the same opportunity to deny parentage as men. 69 
If equal protection affords women the same opportunity to deny 
parentage as men, by inference women should also have the same 
opportunity as men to establish parentage. 70 If the intended parent of 
the child carried by a gestational surrogate were the child's ova 
mother instead of the genetic father, would she be considered a 
"natural parent" in the same way that a man would? She shares a 
genetic connection to the child just as a biological father does. Here 
the ova mother might be able to obtain a court order establishing her 
as the natural parent as opposed to the surrogate. 71 
In cases where the gestational carrier is not a surrogate but an 
intended mother and lesbian partner of the ova mother, the ova 
mother who provided ova with the intent to also become a parent 
seems to lose her status as a natural mother. 72 The gestational 
carrier's choice of whether to be a surrogate or a mother determines 
the rights of the ova mother. 73 If the court is willing to hold that an 
ova mother could be the natural mother of a child born to a 
gestational surrogate,74 a stepparent or second parent adoption in 
cases where the ova mother adopts her genetic child carried by her 
partner seems contrary to the court's prior holdings that adoption by a 
natural parent is not appropriate. 75 This scenario illustrates the need 
for a statutory definition of maternity that allows for recognition of 
66. See In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 284 & n.15, 285, 294-96, 923 A.2d 115 n.15, 
126-27, 131-33 (2007). By allowing the birth mother to disestablish her maternity, 
the court tacitly accepted that she will be the mother unless she does so. See id. 
67. See id. 
68. Id. at 284 & n.15, 285, 923 A.2d at 125 & n.15, 126. 
69. Id. at 279-80, 923 A.2d at 122-23. 
70. See id. at 274-77,279,284-85,923 A.2d at 120-21, 124-26. 
71. See supra Part II.A. 
72. See infra Parts II.c., lILA-B. 
73. See infra Parts II.C., IILA-B; supra Part II.A. 
74. See supra Part ILA. This happens when the court issues an order of parentage 
declaring the genetic mother the natural mother. See supra Part II.A. 
75. See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 127-29,656 A.2d 773,777-79 (1995). 
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the parental status of both the ova and birth mothers when they are in 
a lesbian relationship and created the child with the intent to be co-
equal parents. As Professor Nancy D. Polikoff put it, "a mother 
should not have to adopt her own child.,,76 That is exactly what 
happens when an ova mother has to adopt her biological child carried 
by her lesbian partner or wife.77 
If the couple is not married and chooses to petition for a second 
parent adoption to establish parental rights, they may face additional 
challenges, as second parent adoption is a legal gray area in 
Maryland. 78 Because adoption exists only by statutory creation, 
adoptions must strictly comply with the provisions in the adoption 
statute.79 The adoption statute in Maryland is silent on whether 
unmarried couples can adopt a child together; therefore, it is not clear 
if these second parent adoptions comply with the statute. 80 
Unmarried couples petitioning for second parent adoptions make the 
argument that second parent adoption is analogous to stepparent 
adoption, which is referenced in the Maryland Code.81 The 
unmarried couple has to argue that their relationship is sufficiently 
analogous to a marriage-that the partner of the prospective 
adoptee's parent is like a spouse.82 
Circuit Courts in Maryland remain split;83 some have granted 
second parent adoptions to unmarried gay couples while other courts 
have denied them because the statute is silent on whether members of 
an unmarried couple can adopt a child together in Maryland. 84 As the 
law in Maryland currently stands, whether a second parent adoption 
76. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage 
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. 1. C.R. & 
C.L. 201,201-203 (2009). 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 59-71. 
78. See Steve Kilar, Same-sex Couples Find an Adoption Haven in City's Circuit Court, 
BALT. SUN, Nov. 13,2011, at 1 (discussing the disagreement among Maryland Circuit 
Courts regarding the legality of second parent adoptions by unmarried couples); 
Carolyn Thaler, Second Parent Adoption-Is it Legal in Maryland?, FAM. L. NEWSL. 
(Md. State Bar Ass'n, BaIt., Md.), Apr. 2010, at 16, 16-17 (arguing that second parent 
adoption is not legal in Maryland because it is not provided for in the adoption 
statute). 
79. Green, 338 Md. at 120-121, 656 A.2d at 774 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery 
Cnty v. Browning, 333 Md. 281,286,635 A.2d 373, 376 (1994)). 
80. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-3B (LexisNexis 2006). 
81. See FAM. LAW §§ 5-3B-13, -21 (referring to "an adoption by a spouse of the 
prospective adoptee's parent"). 
82. See Thaler, supra note 78. 
83. See Kilar, supra note 78. 
84. See F AM. LAW § 5-3B; Kilar, supra note 78. 
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will be granted depends to a great extent on the judge and the venue 
where a couple files. 85 
Given the issue of whether adoption is appropriate in cases 
involving an ova mother and a birth mother in a lesbian relationship, 
it is clear that adoption is an inadequate measure for establishing 
parental rights for the ova mother. 86 Furthermore, requiring the ova 
mother to pursue adoption in order to establish parentage imposes 
upon her the added and unfair expense of all the court costs incurred 
in the adoption process on top of the already high cost of conceiving 
the child through ART. 87 Because most families who adopt can 
recoup their expenses through a federal tax credit, the tax payers end 
up footing the bill for this inadequate solution. 88 Additionally, the 
process wastes judicial resources and is time consuming. 
C. Current Remedies Require Consent 
While orders of parentage and adoption are inherently flawed 
measures for establishing parentage because they rely on a 
construction of laws that never conceived of situations where a child 
has two biological intended mothers, their biggest weakness lies in 
the fact that they require the consent of the birth mother in order for 
the ova mother to have any parental rights.89 Domestic discord is not 
limited to heterosexual couples and it is possible that the couple 
could break up before legal parenthood for the ova mother is 
established. The ova mother would then be left in the tenuous 
position of having to depend on the magnanimity of her ex -partner to 
consent to the establishment of her parental rights. 90 Unlike the birth 
mother, whose rights are automatically recognized, the ova mother's 
rights are contingent on consent that she might not receive.91 
If the birth mother fails to consent, the ova mother would be treated 
as a third party and not as a parent. 92 Because parenthood is a 
85. !d. 
86. See supra notes 63-89 and accompanying text. 
87. See Donor Eggs, AM. PREGNANCY AsS'N, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/ 
infertility/donoreggs.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (estimating the cost of each in 
vitro fertilization cycle involving donor eggs to be between $15,000 and $20,000). 
While most families may be able to recoup their adoption expenses through the 
adoption tax credit, they have to be able to pay those legal fees initially. See supra 
note 60 (explaining the tax credit for families who adopt under l.R.C. § 23 (2006)). 
88. See supra note 60 (explaining that families who adopt children can claim a tax credit 
to recoup their legal expenses under l.R.C. § 23 (2006)). 
89. See supra Part Il.A-B. 
90. See supra Part II.A-B. 
91. See supra Part Il.A-B. 
92. See supra notes 17-34 and accompanying text. 
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fundamental right and the court presumes that a fit parent acts in the 
best interest of the child,93 the ova mother would face significant 
legal hurdles to establish any custody or visitation rights to the child 
if she is viewed as a third party rather than a legal parent.94 To have 
any rights to visitation or custody as a third party in Maryland, the 
ova mother would have to prove that the birth mother was unfit or 
that there were "extraordinary circumstances" that make not 
awarding custody detrimental to the child and that granting her 
custody is in the best interest of the child.95 The fact that the ova 
mother has been acting as the child's parent does not in and of itself 
constitute extraordinary circumstances.96 Furthermore, the couple 
could break up before the child is even born. 
Without a statute that recognizes her parental status from the time 
the child is conceived, the ova mother faces an uphill battle to 
establish her parentage that depends on judicial determinations and 
the consent of her partner.97 Whether a Maryland court would hold 
that an ova mother providing her egg to her lesbian partner with the 
intent that they would both serve as biological mothers to the child 
constitutes "extraordinary circumstances" is hard to predict. 98 It 
would be a case of first impression for the state, and the Maryland 
Code provides little guidance.99 Maryland courts would likely look to 
other jurisdictions across the country to see how they have handled 
similar situations. 
III. PRIOR CASE LA W FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
INVOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN AN OVA MOTHER 
AND A BIRTH MOTHER IN A LESBIAN RELATIONSHIP 
There is surprisingly little case law regarding disputes between 
couples where both female partners shared a biological connection to 
the child they conceived through ART. In fact, there are only two 
cases that are directly analogous to the issue at hand. 100 
93. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
94. McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320,418-19,869 A.2d 751, 807-09 (2005). 
95. Id. 
96. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661,695,948 A.2d 73, 93 (2008) (holding that a 
de facto parent relationship with a child "is a factor in fmding exceptional 
circumstances" but it is not determinative). 
97. See supra Part ILA-B. 
98. See McDermott, 385 Md. at 417-19,869 A.2d at 808-09. 
99. See supra Part ILA-B. 
100. See infra Part lILA-B. 
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A. KM v. E.G. 
In KM v. E.G, the Supreme Court of California held that a child 
could have two natural mothers. 101 The parties in KM were an 
estranged lesbian couple. l02 One partner gave birth to twins after 
being impregnated through in vitro fertilization using her partner's 
egg. 103 The ova mother never adopted the twins and the birth mother 
was the sole parent listed on the birth certificate. 104 
A central issue in the case was whether California's statute 
governing sperm donation, which held that a man is not the father if 
he supplies semen to inseminate a woman who is not his wife, 105 
applied in this scenario.106 In arguing that the ova mother was not the 
girls' natural mother and had no parental rights to the children, the 
birth mother asserted that the ova mother was akin to a sperm 
donor. 107 Under this interpretation, the ova mother waived any 
parental rights she had as the genetic mother of the child by donating 
her ova.108 However, the court held that this statute did not apply 
because the ova mother "supplied her ova to impregnate her lesbian 
partner in order to produce children who would be raised in their joint 
home.,,109 The ova mother was not a donor because she provided the 
ova with the intent to be a mother to the child. 110 
In rendering its decision that both women were natural mothers to 
the twins, the KM court applied California's UP A, which contains 
two key provisions regarding the determination of maternity. III The 
first provision provides that a parent-child relationship may be 
established between a child and the natural mother "by proof of her 
having given birth to the child.,,112 The California UPA, however, 
also recognizes that the birth mother is not necessarily the natural 
101. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005). 
102. Jd. 
103. Id. 
104. Jd. at 676-77. 
105. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2012). This section is substantially similar to 
Section 5 of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act. Compare id., with UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT § 5 (1973). 
106. K.M, 117 P.3d at 676-77. 
107. Id. 
108. Jd. at 677. 
109. Jd. at 678. 
110. Jd. at 682. 
111. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2012) (codifying UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3 (1973) 
into California state law); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 2012) (codifying UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (1973) into California state law). 
112. FAM. CODE § 7610(a). 
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mother and that maternity could be disputed. I I3 In the event of a 
dispute regarding maternity, the statute states that "[a ]ny interested 
person may bring an action to determine the existence or 
nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. Insofar as 
practicable, the provisions of this part applicable to the father and 
child relationship apply.,,114 
The court in KM relied on the precedent set out in Johnson v. 
Calvert, another case involving disputed parentage between a 
gestational surrogate and the child's genetic parents. 115 In Johnson, a 
gestational surrogate, impregnated via in vitro fertilization using 
gametes from the married couple who was the child's intended 
parents, sued to be declared the child's mother. 116 The court held that 
the child's genetic parents were the child's natural and legal 
parents. 1I7 Both women in the case presented proof per the 
requirements of California's parentage statute that they were the 
child's natural mother: a genetic connection for the ova mother and 
proof of giving birth for the surrogate. 118 Looking at the intent of the 
parties as expressed in the surrogacy agreement, the court concluded 
that where the ova mother and the birth mother are not the same; "she 
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to 
raise as her own-is the natural mother.,,119 Based on the surrogacy 
agreement, the birth mother was never the intended parent of the 
resulting child; rather the genetic mother and father were the intended 
parents. 120 
Where the parentage claims in Johnson were mutually exclusive, 
the ova mother in KM acknowledged that the birth mother was also 
the twins' mother. 121 Her maternity claim was in addition to the birth 
mother's. 122 In Johnson the court used an intent test to break a tie 
between two competing claims for parentage, but the KM court held 
that where there was no surrogacy agreement extinguishing parental 
rights, a child could have two natural mothers under California's 
parentage statute. 123 There was a question of fact regarding whether 
the ova mother waived her parental rights when she signed the donor 
113. Id. § 7650(a). 
114. Id. 
115. K.M, 117 P.3d at 678-79 (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (1993)). 
116. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 780-81 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 890-97 (repealed 1994)). 
119. Id. at 782. 
120. Id. 
121. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 680-81 (Cal. 2005). 
122. Id. at 681. 
123. Id. 
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agreement at the fertility clinic. 124 However, the court in K.M found 
her intent to raise the child in a joint home with the birth mother 
dispositive noting that: 
A woman who supplies ova to be used to impregnate her 
lesbian partner, with the understanding that the resulting 
child will be raised in their joint home, cannot waive her 
responsibility to support that child. Nor can such a 
purported waiver effectively cause that woman to relinquish 
her parental rights. 125 
The ova mother's claim to parenthood was "equal to, and arose at 
the same time" as the birth mother's claim. 126 
B. TMH. v. D.M T 
Where the California courts in K.M and Johnson had a statutory 
framework in the form of California's UP A in which they assessed 
the disputed maternity of the parties, 127 Maryland has no such 
statutory framework because the Maryland Code does not define 
maternity. 128 Similar to Maryland, Florida has no statutory 
framework for determining disputed maternity. 129 But in TMH. v. 
D.MT, the Florida District Court of Appeal had to resolve whether 
an ova mother and a birth mother could share parental rights. 130 
Florida currently has a statute regarding gamete donation holding that 
"[t]he donor of any egg, sperm or pre-embryo, other than the 
commissioning couple or a father who has executed a preplanned 
adoption agreement ... shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights 
and obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting 
children." 131 The trial court held that the ova mother was a donor 
under the meaning of the statute and that she waived all maternal 
rights when she transferred the ovum to her partner. 132 The appellate 
court reversed, holding that the trial court's interpretation of the 
124. Id. at 676-78. 
125. Id. at 682. 
126. Id. 
127. See supra Part lILA. 
128. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
129. See T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So.3d 787, 803-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Monaco, 1., 
concurring); supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
130. T.MH, 79 So.3d at 788. 
131. FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2012). 
132. T.MH, 79 So.3d at 788, 790-91. 
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statute was unconstitutional, and recognizing that both the ova 
mother and the birth mother had parental rights to the child. 133 
The case centered on interpreting the term donor, which the statute 
does not define. 134 The dissent interpreted donor to include any 
individual who transfers gametes and does not fall within certain 
narrow exceptions. 135 Thus, a lesbian transferring her ova to her 
partner is a mere donor regardless of intent. 136 
The majority concluded that the dissent's interpretation of donor 
eliminated a lesbian's right "to procreate and parent a child of her 
own by transferring her ova to her lesbian partner.,,137 The majority 
concluded that the dissent's interpretation of the statute violated the 
ova mother's rights to equal protection and privacy, and so was not a 
permissible interpretation. 138 
In this case, the ova mother shared not only a biological connection 
to the child as her genetic parent but also a parent-child relationship 
for the first several years of the child's life.139 Ultimately, the court 
found that both the ova mother and the birth mother had 
constitutional rights as parents meriting equal protection. 140 At the 
same time, the court left the issue of whether the ova mother's rights 
were constitutionally protected open to appeal when it certified the 
following question to the Florida Supreme Court: 
Does application of section 742.14 to deprive parental rights 
to a lesbian woman who provided her ova to her lesbian 
133. Id. at 800,803. 
134. Jd. at 790-91. 
135. Jd. at 809 (Lawson, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. at 809-15 (finding that the majority's interpretation of the term donor "render[ed] 
the statutory exceptions meaningless" and "defeat[ed] the clear purpose of the 
statute"). 
137. Id. at 792 (majority opinion). 
138. Jd. at 792-800. The fundamental right to privacy includes autonomy to make 
personal decisions regarding procreation and child rearing, and "persons in a 
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual 
persons do." Id. at 793 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003». The 
majority reasoned that if the statute were to automatically categorize the ova mother 
as a donor, it effectively denies her right to personal autonomy to make these 
decisions by forcing her to relinquish her maternal rights. Jd. at 793, 798-800. 
139. Jd. at 789-90. 
140. Id. at 802-03. The court framed the issue of whether the ova mother had 
constitutionally protected parental rights within the line of prior cases involving 
parental rights for unwed fathers. /d. at 797 (citing Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248, 
261 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979». In that line of cases, 
the Supreme Court held that a biological connection plus an established parent child 
relationship is necessary before parental rights merit constitutional protection. See 
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261; Caban, 441 U.S. at 392. 
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partner so both women could have a child to raise together 
as equal parental partners and who did parent the child for 
several years after its birth render the statute 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Privacy 
clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions?141 
381 
By certifying the question for review by the Florida Supreme 
Court, the District Court of Appeal failed to unequivocally determine 
that the ova mother's parental rights are protected. 142 
C. Possible Implications of Other Jurisdictional Case Law for 
Maryland Courts 
Since KM and TMH are only persuasive authority, a Maryland 
court would not have to rely on their precedents. Whether a 
Maryland court would recognize the ova mother's parental rights in 
the event of a dispute between a birth mother and an ova mother 
remains unclear. 143 While the court in KM recognized the parental 
rights of both the birth mother and the ova mother, the California 
court was working within the statutory framework of the UP A of 
1973 that provides for resolving disputed maternity.l44 Maryland has 
no analogous parentage statute that defines maternity. 145 
Consequently, a Maryland court could conclude that KM is 
unpersuasive. 
The precedent from TMH. would likely be more persuasive to a 
Maryland court because Florida, like Maryland, lacks a definition of 
maternity.146 If faced with the question of whether an ova mother has 
parental rights when the birth mother disputes them, a Maryland 
court would have to engage in an analysis similar to the court's 
analysis in TMH. 147 While the majority in TMH. concluded that 
the ova mother was indeed a legal mother with constitutionally 
protected rights,148 the court also equivocated in its conclusion by 
certifying the constitutional question for the Florida Supreme 
Court. 149 The Florida Supreme Court has yet to answer that question. 
A Maryland court could agree with the majority opinion in TMH. 
141. T.M.H, 79 So. 3d at 803. 
142. See id. 
143. See supra Part lIl.A-B. 
144. See supra Part 1Il.A. 
145. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra Part IlI.B; supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra Part IlI.B; supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
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that not recognizing the ova mother's parental rights infringes on her 
fundamental rights and denies her equal protection. 150 A Maryland 
court, however, might also reasonably side with the dissent in T.MH 
and find that the ova mother is not a mother with constitutionally 
protected fundamental rights. 151 The precedent from T.MH is not 
binding on a Maryland court. 
Prior case law serves to further illustrate the need to define 
maternity so that the ova mother and birth mother can establish their 
roles as coequal parents from the beginning. 152 As Judge Sawaya 
noted in his concurrence in T.MH, "this unexplored legal terrain 
begs for legislation."153 Without legislation recognizing her legal 
parenthood, the ova mother faces the risk of being treated as a legal 
stranger with no parental rights to her child.154 
IV. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING PARENTAGE STATUTES 
Maryland needs a statutory definition of maternity that would 
recognize the maternity of both the ova mother and the birth mother 
when they are in a lesbian relationship and create a child together 
with the intent of being coequal parents. 155 An effective statute that 
protects the rights of both mothers would recognize their coequal 
parental relationships with the child before the child is born. In 
drafting legislation to define maternity, the Maryland legislature 
could look to the 1973 and 2000 versions of the UPA I56 and the ABA 
Model Ace57 for guidance. While these statutory models do not 
explicitly cover the situation of an ova mother and a birth mother 
who are both intended parents,158 they are a helpful starting point, 
especially since Maryland lacks any statutory framework for handling 
this situation. 159 
150. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra Part lILA-B. 
153. T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So.3d 787,804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
154. See supra Part II. 
155. See supra Part II. 
156. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3 (1973) (defining how parent and child relationship is 
established); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (2000) (amended 2002) (defining how 
maternity is determined). 
157. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 603 (2008) (defining parentage of 
child of assisted reproduction) available at http://apps.americanbar.orglfarnily/ 
committees/artmodelact.pdf. 
158. See infra Part N.A-C. 
159. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
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A. Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 
The UP A was originally passed in 1973 and was updated in 
2000.160 The 1973 version of the UPA has been adopted and codified 
by eleven states. 161 The Act holds that "[t]he parent and child 
relationship between a child... and the natural mother may be 
established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or under 
this ACt.,,162 The Act later notes that "provisions of this Act 
applicable to the father and child relationship apply" to the 
determination of maternity.163 Thus, an ova mother who is not the 
birth mother would have to rely on the Act's provisions for 
determining paternity to establish her maternity. 164 
Among the provisions for determining paternity in the Act is the 
rebuttable presumption of paternity where the alleged father received 
the child into his home and openly held the child out as his.165 
Applying this presumption to the determination of maternity could 
help an ova mother who had a parental relationship with the child 
carried by her lesbian partner establish her maternity.166 However, 
this presumption does not help the ova mother whose lesbian 
relationship with the birth mother ends before she has the opportunity 
to receive the child into her home and hold him out as her own.167 
The statute also includes a presumption that a child born of a valid 
marriage is the natural child of the mother's husband. 168 The other 
method for determining paternity described in the Act that would be 
applicable to establish maternity is the use of a blood test to 
160. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3 (1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (2000) (amended 
2002). 
161. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West 2012); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-4-
101 to -130 (West 2011); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 584-1 to -26 (LexisNexis 2011); 
750 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 45/1 to 45/28 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 
to -1138 (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-75 (West 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 
210.817-854 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -135 (2011); NEV. REv. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 126.011 to -371 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to-
59 (West 2012); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01 to -19 (LexisNexis 2012). As 
previously noted, this version of the UP A adopted in California provided the basis for 
the decisions in K.M v. E.G. and Johnson v. Calvert. See supra Part lILA. 
162. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3 (1973). 
163. Id. § 21. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. § 4. 
166. See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005). The court relied in part on this 
presumption when it held that the ova mother was a legal and natural mother. See id. 
The fact that the ova mother intended to raise the child in her joint home with the birth 
mother was a determinative factor in the court's decision. See id. 
167. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973). 
168. See id. 
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establishing a genetic connection. 169 Using a blood test, an ova 
mother would be able to establish a genetic connection to her child in 
the same way as an alleged father's paternity is determined. 170 
Courts working within the statutory framework of the 1973 version 
of the Act have concluded that an ova mother and a birth mother can 
be coequal natural mothers. 171 However, analysis of the Act does not 
clearly and explicitly lead to this conclusion because the Act's 
limited coverage of assisted reproductive technology only deals with 
artificial insemination.172 This provision holds that a husband who 
consents to the artificial insemination of his wife with donated semen 
is the natural father and the semen donor is not treated as a parent in 
law.173 To establish her maternity, an ova mother has to prove she is 
not akin to a sperm donor described in the Act. 174 Courts struggling 
with interpretation of this provision developed intent tests to 
determine parentage where a child is born as a result of ART in order 
to reach an equitable solution that a literal interpretation of the Act 
would not provide. 175 The Act itself is silent on the issue of intent in 
this context. 176 
B. Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 
In 2000, the UPA was revised177 and has since been adopted and 
codified in eight states. 178 With regard to the determination of 
maternity, the Act was amended to state that "[p ]rovisions of this 
[Act] relating to the determination of paternity apply to 
determinations ofmatemity.,,179 While the language in the new act is 
updated, the implication of the language's meaning is substantially 
169. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12 (1973). 
170. See id. Even if the couple were legally married, this marital presumption might not 
provide adequate protection of parental rights. See supra notes 18-25 and 
accompanying text. 
171. See K.M, 117 P.3d at 682. 
172. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973). The Act does not even contemplate ovum 
donation. See id. 
173. See id. 
174. See K.M, 117 P.3d at 675. 
175. See id. at 677-79. 
176. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973). 
177. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002). The UPA was amended in part to 
address the legal issues created by assisted reproduction. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
Art. 7 introductory cmt. (2000) (amended 2002). 
178. ALA. CODE § 26-17-101 (Supp. 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-101 (Supp. 
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-01 (Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11A-
101 to -903 (Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700-101 (Supp. 2012); TEx. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.001 (West Supp. 2012); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.011 
(West Supp. 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-401 to -907 (2011). 
179. UN1F. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (2000) (amended 2002). 
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similar to the 1973 version. 180 The Act was updated significantly to 
address many of the issues stemming from ART and consequently 
would be more useful to the Maryland legislature drafting a statute 
that defines maternity to recognize the parental rights of both an ova 
mother and a birth mother than the 1973 version. 181 Yet the UP A of 
2000 still has shortcomings in its failure to specifically address issues 
related to dual maternity.182 
Where the 1973 version only addressed parentage in the context of 
ART with regard to artificial insemination,183 the updated Act of 2000 
provides a broader statutory framework that addresses some of the 
more complex parentage issues that are now possible through ART. 184 
The current Act shields egg and sperm donors from parentage of 
children conceived through ART.18S It also differentiates between 
individuals who are true donors, those who donate gametes without 
the intent of becoming legal parents, and those who provide gametes 
with the intent to become parents. 186 Specifically, the Act covers 
paternity of children conceived through ART and recognizes intent to 
establish paternity stating that "[a] man who provides sperm for, or 
consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman ... with the intent to 
be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.,,187 The 
Act does not differentiate between whether or not the man has to be 
married to the woman in order to be the parent of the resulting 
child,188 but it does require written consent from both intended 
parents. 189 
There is no equivalent of this provision holding that a woman who 
provides ova with the intent to be a parent is a parent to the resulting 
child. 190 However, because the determination of maternity provision 
holds that "[p]rovisions of this [Act] relating to determination of 
paternity apply to determinations of maternity," the provision could 
be used to establish maternity. 191 Under this Act, an ova mother who 
180. Compare id. with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (1973). 
181. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Art. 7 cmt. (2000) (amended 2002). 
182. See infra notes 183-99 and accompanying text. 
183. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973). 
184. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Art. 7 introductory cmt. (2000) (amended 2002). 
185. Id. § 702. 
186. Id. § 703. 
187. Id. Section 704 of the 2000 version of the UPA requires the intent to be a parent to be 
expressed in writing. Id. § 704. 
188. Id. § 704. 
189. Id. 
190. See id. 
191. Id. § 106. 
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provided her egg to her partner with the intent that they would both 
be parents to the child would have parental rights. 192 
While the UP A of 2000 is an improvement over the 1973 Act in its 
coverage of ART,193 there are still ambiguities regarding maternity 
that could be more effectively resolved. 194 The Act fails to explicitly 
cover the unique issues of maternity involving lesbian partners who 
have a child together through ART whereby one partner is the ova 
mother and the other is the birth mother. 195 In each of the provisions 
of the Act discussing intentional parenthood by two parents, the Act's 
language refers to a man and woman. 196 In order to establish herself 
as a parent, the ova mother has to argue that these provisions for 
establishing paternity are applicable to her. 197 To prove she is a 
mother, she has to argue that she is like a father to her child. 198 The 
Act can be interpreted to allow for recognition of two natural 
mothers, but a mother should not have to argue that she is like a 
father to establish her parentage. 199 An ova mother is a mother, not a 
father, to her child. Effective legislation that protects the coequal 
maternity rights of an ova mother and a birth mother would explicitly 
recognize both women as parents without forcing the ova mother to 
analogize herself to a father. 
C. American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted 
Reproductive Technology 
The Maryland legislature could also tum to the ABA Model Act for 
guidance in drafting legislation that would define maternity. 200 The 
ABA Model Act takes the issues of maternity and paternity addressed 
192. See id. § 702. 
193. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
194. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. 
195. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701-801 (2000) (amended 2002). 
196. ld. §§ 703, 704, 801. 
197. ld. §§ 106,703. 
198. See id. § 106, 703. While an ova mother is similar to a father who provided sperm 
with the intent of being a parent in that both are the genetic parents of the resulting 
child, providing ova and sperm are different processes. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., 
Collaborative Reproduction and Rethinking Parentage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. 
LAW. 43, 49 (2008) (discussing how harvesting ova is a far more invasive procedure 
and process than collecting sperm). 
199. See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 674, 681-82 (Cal. 2005). 
200. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (2008). The Model Act was 
approved in 2008 by the Section Council of the American Bar Association Section of 
Family Law's Committee on Reproductive and Genetic Technology. MODEL ACT 
GoVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. prefatory note (2008). The drafters wrote this 
model piece of legislation in recognition of the need for comprehensive legislation 
dealing with the complex issues and controversies that result from gaps between 
current law and the realities of ART. See id. 
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in the UP A of 2000 in the context of ART one step further by 
referring to parentage of the children of assisted reproduction without 
specific reference to maternity or paternity.201 With regard to 
parentage of a child of assisted reproduction, the ABA Model Act 
holds that "[a]n individual who provides gametes for, or consents to, 
assisted reproduction by a woman ... with the intent to be a parent of 
her child is a parent of the resulting child.,,202 Instead of holding that 
provisions for determining paternity apply to determining maternity, 
the ABA Model Act simply addresses determining parentage. 203 It 
does not differentiate between whether a genetic parent provided 
sperm or ova and instead uses the term gametes, which includes both 
sperm and ova.204 
While the language in the ABA Model Act is gender neutral, the 
implications are the same as those of the UP A in that they both 
recognize intended parenthood.205 The legislative note preceding 
article 6 of the ABA Model Act states, "It is not the intent of this act 
to conflict with or supersede provisions of the Uniform Parentage 
Act.,,206 Under the ABA Model Act, the ova mother is not forced to 
argue that she is like a man who provides sperm with the intention of 
being a father.207 However, the ABA Model Act's gender neutral 
language falls short of explicitly recognizing that a child can have 
two legal mothers who share a biological connection with him. 208 
The language helps resolve disputes between intended parents and 
surrogates, whether they are traditional or gestational surrogates, but 
does little to recognize the unique situation of a lesbian couple who 
conceives a child together with the intent of being co-parents 
whereby one partner is the birth mother and the other is the ova 
mother.209 This is not a gender neutral situation. An effective statute 
201. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (2000) (amended 2002) (referring to a man 
who provides sperm with intent to be the parent of the resulting child), with MODEL 
ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §§ 602-04 (2008) (referring to an 
individual who provides gametes with the intent to be a parent to the resulting child). 
202. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 603 (2008). Section 604 of the 
ABA Model Act requires written consent. Id. § 604. 
203. Id. § 603. 
204. Id. 
205. See id.; supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
206. MODEL ACT GoVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. Art. 6, legislative note. 
207. Compare id. § 603 (using gender neutral language to refer to the individual who 
provides gametes and intends to be the parent), with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 106, 
703 (2000) (amended 2002) (referring exclusively to the man who provides sperm and 
intends to be the parent). 
208. MODEL ACT GoVERNING AsSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 603. 
209. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Considering Mom: Maternity and the Model Act 
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'y & L. 
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defining maternity that protects the parental rights of both the ova 
mother and the birth mother would draw on the recognition of intent 
provided for in the ABA Model Act and the UP A and explicitly hold 
that both women are legal mothers at birth. 210 
V. PROPOSED STATUTE 
Maryland needs a maternity statute that explicitly allows for 
recognition of dual maternity in cases where the birth mother and the 
ova mother are a lesbian couple who created the child together with 
the shared intention of being of coequal parents.211 Borrowing from 
the written consent requirements in the UP A of 2000 and the ABA 
Model Act,212 this law would require the birth mother and the ova 
mother to express their intention of being coequal mothers in writing 
in order for their dual maternity to be recognized. The law would 
also require an affidavit from the reproductive endocrinologist who 
performed the procedure supporting that the ova mother is indeed the 
child's genetic mother and that both parties clearly expressed their 
intent be parents prior to the procedure. If the mothers can prove 
they have met these requirements included in the statute, they would 
be able to obtain a pre-birth order of parentage that recognizes them 
both as legal parents. 
Under this proposed statute, which would explicitly recognize her 
parentage rights, the ova mother would not have to argue that she is .j 
like an intended father who provides sperm for insemination as she 
would under the UP A, 213 Rather than relying on provisions for 
establishing paternity in the hope that the court finds those provisions 
applicable to the determination of her maternity,214 the statute would 
provide a framework that specifically allows for an ova mother to 
establish her maternity. 
Maryland judges already grant these pre-birth orders of parentage 
to lesbian couples who fulfill these requirements. 215 The maternity 
statute I propose would provide a statutory basis for these orders so 
they are not based entirely in equity and construction of law. 216 
Judges reviewing petitions for a judgment declaring parentage would 
601, 615-16 (2009) (discussing how the ABA Model Act provides a framework for 
resolving maternity disputes in the context of surrogacy). 
210. See MODEL ACT GoVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 603; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
§§ 106, 703; infra Part V. 
211. See supra Part II. 
212. See supra notes 187-189,202 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra Part II.A. 
216. See supra Part II.A. 
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detennine if the parties satisfied the statutory requirements for 
obtaining the order. Having a statutory basis for granting the order 
would make it less liable to challenge in the event that the birth 
mother later changed her mind.217 This would provide more 
protection for the parental rights of the ova mother and more stability 
in the family relationship for the child.218 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Orders of parentage and second parent adoptions have been 
sufficient so far to protect parental rights in Maryland where a child 
is born through ART with both an ova mother and a birth mother to 
the extent that they have never been challenged.219 But a case will 
undoubtedly come in the future where these measures are challenged 
by a couple in dispute. Based upon the precedents from case law in 
other jurisdictions, a Maryland court might conceivably hold that 
both the ova mother and the birth mother are the natural mother when 
they conceived the child through ART with the intent that they both 
serve as parents.220 But that outcome is not entirely certain and 
neither Maryland law nor precedents from other jurisdictions address 
the issue entirely.221 This is an issue of serious importance to public 
policy that should not be decided by a judge legislating from the 
bench. 
Furthennore, a statute providing a framework for establishing dual 
maternity would lead to a reliable system of justice across the entire 
state.222 Whether an ova mother can obtain judicial recognition of her 
parental rights should not depend on where she files a petition 
because only some judges are willing to construe the law in a way 
that grants her rights.223 A statute that provides a legal mechanism 
for obtaining judicial recognition of dual maternity would remove 
this private system of justice because judges across Maryland would 
be making decisions in the context of the same statutory 
framework. 224 Ova mothers would be able to consistently obtain an 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58. 
218. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra Part ILA-B. Maryland's same-sex marriage law went into effect so 
recently that stepparent adoptions for same-sex couples have yet to be granted as of 
publication of this comment. 
220. See supra Part III. 
221. See supra Part IILe. 
222. See supra notes 55-58, 84-86 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra Part II.A-B. 
224. See supra Part II.A-B. 
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order of parentage if they met the statutory requirements no matter 
which judge reviewed the petition. 
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